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Introduction
Over the past couple of decades a large body of literature analysing the business
cycle ﬂuctuations has employed the New Keyensian models.This framework
introduces the traditional Keynesian emphasis on the short-term price stickiness
into the neoclassical paradigm that features dynamic optimisation and
microfoundations.Thepresent paper builds on recent pedagogical literature that
introduces the New Keynesian framework into undergraduate economics curricula
by considering several versions of the standard New Keynesian model and by
describing an Excel-based application that facilitates learning the internal logic of
these models.
A large body of recent pedagogical literature has suggested alternatives to the
traditional Keynesian IS/LM–AS/AD framework.Colander (1995) discusses the
analytical gaps in the standard AS/AD model.Taylor (2000) and Romer (2000) point
out that modern central banks do not target money supply but interest rates and
replace the price level with inﬂation in the AS/AD model.Walsh (2002) emphasises
the fact that central banks do not set their interest rate targets exogenously but,to
a large extent,in response to inﬂation and he modiﬁes the analysis to account for
the fact that output needs to be normalised by its natural level.Carlin and Soskice
(2005) and Boﬁnger et al.(2006) build on this work to present extensive graphical
apparatuses for the analysis of models related to the baseline New Keynesian
model that describes the interplay of inﬂation,output gap and interest rate.Guest
(2003) and Turner (2006) suggest different modiﬁcations of the model that improve
its pedagogical accessibility.Finally,the model has made solid inroads into
undergraduate textbooks:Stiglitz and Walsh (2002) and Taylor (2007) emphasise
inﬂation targeting at the principles level using graphical analysis whereas Carlin
and Soskice (2006) and Jones (2007) provide an extensive treatment of a dynamic
New Keynesian model at the intermediate level.
This paper complements existing pedagogical work by providing an easy-to-use
Excel-based interface where students can develop intuition about the model by
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The ﬁrst baseline New Keynesian model describes the joint interaction of three sets
of macroeconomic actors.The IS relation describes the behaviour of households,
the AS (aggregate supply) relation represents the ﬁrms’pricing decisions,and the
MR (monetary rule) relation characterises the conduct of monetary policy by the
central bank.1These equations jointly determine three endogenous variables:
nominal interest rates (i),output gap (x,percentage difference between actual





Here r* is the natural interest rate that is consistent with the long-run output gap of
zero,π* can be interpreted as the central bank’s target rate of inﬂation and private
sector’s long-term inﬂationary expectations,and i* is the nominal interest rate that is
consistent with the output gap of zero and these expectations (i* = r* + π*).
Parameters have the standard economic interpretations:σ is the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution;κ is the slope of the aggregate supply relation that
signals the degree of price stickiness (ﬂatter AS implies stickier prices);γπ gauges
central bank’s response to departures of inﬂation from the long-term target,whereas
γx measures its sensitivity to the output gap.Plugging (3) into (1) and solving for
inﬂation,one can obtain the aggregate demand schedule.As Clarida et al.(1999)
point out,the model’s stability condition,also known as the Taylor principle,that
gives rise to the downward-sloping demand schedule,requires that γπ> 1.
The setup above constitutes the ‘instrument’version of the baseline model,
whereby the central bank deﬁnes the instrument of its policy – the nominal interest
rate – in terms of the other variables of interest.(1) and (3) can be jointly analysed in
the IS/MR model,where inﬂation is taken as exogenous.Together these two
equations can be used to derive the downward-sloping (in the x-π plane)
aggregate demand schedule that together with aggregate supply determines the
equilibrium rate of inﬂation.
Instead of following this instrument rule,the central bank may discretionarily
minimise the social welfare loss associated with volatility of deviations of inﬂation
from the target and of output gap subject to aggregate supply:
(4) .
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changing parameters and studying the effects of different shocks.The most
extensive addition to the current body of work concerns introducing dynamic
effects into the model,as endogenous variables adjust to exogenous disturbances.
These dynamic effects are summarised by shifts in the model’s structural relations
and the impulse responses of endogenous variables.This setup allows us to move
beyond the standard static models and examine the implications of differences in
agents’expectations as well as additional issues,such as the time-inconsistency of
optimal policy.Hence different sections of this paper provide examples of
variations of the model that are suitable for coverage in principles through
intermediate to advanced elective courses.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.First,I brieﬂy discuss the baseline New
Keynesian model and a static version of a three-variable model that is very similar
to the one discussed in Boﬁnger et al.(2006).This model provides a direct response
to the Romer (2000) challenge that ‘[e]ven the easiest models with microeconomic
foundations are much harder than corresponding ingredients of IS-LM-AS’.Next,we
provide a basic dynamic extension of the model in the previous section by
assuming that inﬂationary expectations are not pegged to the long-run inﬂation
rate but adjust adaptively.We then extend the basic setup into the standard
dynamic setting that features rational expectations and persistent exogenous
shocks.This variant of the model can be explicitly derived from microfoundations.
Discussion is supplemented using examples from the companion Excel workbook.
Finally,we have a concluding section.
Static New Keynesian models
This section considers two static variants of the New Keynesian model.Following
the nomenclature established by Svensson (2002,2003),the conduct of monetary
policy is described by either an instrument or a targeting monetary policy rule.The
‘instrument’model assumes that the central bank sets the nominal interest rate
according to the Taylor rule,in response to output gap and inﬂation.Taylor (1993)
was ﬁrst to suggest a version of this rule as a descriptor of monetary policy conduct
in the United States.However,Svensson (2002,2003) argues that although such
rules are likely to describe a substantial share of monetary policy decision making,
the dynamic minimisation of the social welfare loss may provide a more rich,
ﬂexible and accurate description of what modern central banks do in practice.The
‘targeting’model,therefore,assumes that the central bank minimises a social
welfare loss given by a weighted average of squared departures of inﬂation from its
target level set by the central bank and output from its potential level.A New Keynesian Workbook 
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Since higher inﬂation will have an effect on the position of the IS and MR schedules,
their position will require secondary adjustments in response to monetary or
demand shocks.Either of those shocks will shift the AD schedule and,for an upward-
sloping AS relation,will generate higher inﬂation.Figure 2 illustrates this point for a
positive demand shock.IS’illustrates the shift of the IS schedule due to the shock
keeping inﬂation constant,whereas IS1 describes the schedule’s ﬁnal position.As
before,higher inﬂation pushes the IS schedule farther up.MR0 shifts to MR1 as the
central bank raises the nominal interest rate in response to higher inﬂation.
Notice that in the targeting model there is no social welfare loss at all.This happens
because the central bank can simply offset the demand shock by adjusting the
nominal interest rate:
This is even though the implied IS schedule shifts in response to the demand shock.
The central bank can pick another interest rate on this new IS schedule that
eliminates social welfare loss by restoring the AD schedule at its pre-shock position.
One way to motivate the presence of monetary shocks in the monetary rule (3) is
by emphasising that the conduct of monetary policy happens in real time,when
the full information about the actual levels of variables is unavailable to central
banks.Therefore,they may temporarily deviate from following rules that otherwise
characterise their policy conduct well.Such deviations may be described by
monetary shocks,εi.4
.
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where α deﬁnes the relative weight of output gap volatility for social preferences.
Note that since demand and monetary shocks can be offset by adjusting the
nominal interest rate accordingly,it is only the supply shocks that present a tradeoff
between stabilising inﬂation and output gap.The discussion below,therefore,
focuses on the effects of a supply shock in this model.2
Figure 1 presents the effect of a 1% supply shock in both the ‘instrument’and
‘targeting’variants of the model.In the former case,the shock shifts the AS
schedule upwards,leading to inﬂation above the target and negative output gap.
Higher inﬂation shifts the MR schedule upwards,because the central bank
responds to higher inﬂation by increasing interest rates more than proportionately.
The IS schedule also shifts upwards proportionately due to the change in inﬂation:
for output gap to remain constant,the real interest rate has to remain constant as
well;hence a percentage increase in inﬂation should be offset by a percentage
increase in the nominal interest rate.3This ﬁgure illustrates the Taylor principle:in
order to achieve stability through a downward-sloping aggregate demand,the
central bank should respond to a percentage increase in inﬂation by raising the
nominal interest rate by more than 1%.
In the targeting panel,the shock has the same effect on aggregate supply.The
ensuing tradeoff between output gap and inﬂation is illustrated by the elliptical
welfare loss function,with the new AS schedule being a tangent to this function.The
panel illustrates that the central bank cannot offset a supply shock and has to pick a
combination of inﬂation and negative output gap in its optimal response to it.




The difference between equations (6) and (2) signals that instead of pegging their
inﬂationary expectations to the long-term inﬂation level,economic agents now
form them adaptively,by observing equilibrium inﬂation in the previous time
period.This mechanism not only shows the short-run equilibrium in immediate
response to a shock,as in the previous section,but also makes it possible to trace
the dynamics of the economy’s adjustment to a long-run equilibrium.
Extending the economy into this context also allows us to distinguish between
temporary/transitory and permanent demand and monetary shocks.(A permanent
supply shock would just result in a perpetually shifting AS schedule without a new
long-run equilibrium being reached.) A permanent demand shock may be
motivated by the change in the long-term real interest rate,whereas a permanent
monetary shock may be motivated by a change in the long-run target inﬂation rate
(e.g.to accomplish a disinﬂation).Transitory shocks disappear in the period after
their initial impact.Impulse responses graph the trajectory of endogenous variables
following the shock.
Figure 4 documents the effect of an adverse supply shock.Initially,the AS schedule
shifts upward but since the AD schedule is downward-sloping,the equilibrium level
of inﬂation is below the vertical intercept of the AS schedule (initially given by the
. ) (
* * i
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Figure 3 describes the effect of a negative (or expansionary) monetary shock that
may be caused by the central bank’s underestimation of the true current level of
inﬂation or output gap.(Nothing shifts in the targeting plane because the
assumption of optimal policy conduct does not allow for such errors in judgement.)
In the IS/MR model,the MR schedule initially shifts down directly to MR’in response
to the shock that drives the nominal interest rate below the level warranted by the
true levels of inﬂation and output gap.This stimulates aggregate demand,which
shifts out from AD0 to AD1,leading to higher equilibrium inﬂation due to the
upward-sloping AS schedule.Higher inﬂation prompts an upward-shift of IS to IS1
and MR to MR1.Insofar as this judgement error is transitory,the economy will be
able to adjust back to the long-run equilibrium level.A description of such an
adjustment requires the introduction of a dynamic component into the model.The
next section describes how this can be accomplished through adaptive inﬂationary
expectations.
A New Keynesian model with adaptive inﬂationary expectations 
As in Carlin and Soskice (2006) or Jones (2007),the basic static model of the
previous section can be easily extended into the dynamic context by introducing
adaptive inﬂationary expectations.Hence the three-equation model becomes:
(5)
(6) , 1
π ε κ π π t t t t x + + = −
, ) (
* x
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Figure 3:Negative Monetary Shock in the Static Models Figure 4:Adverse Supply Shock in the Adaptive Expectations ModelA New Keynesian Workbook 
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new position of the MR schedule would have to account for the lower inﬂation.In
this case,however,the AD schedule stays at the same position,which is necessary
to accomplish disinﬂation.As the AS schedule keeps shifting down,the output gap
gradually increases back to zero;this adjustment process stabilises at a lower
equilibrium level of inﬂation.Impulse responses detail the trajectory of the
variables as disinﬂation is undertaken:The nominal interest rate increases initially to
achieve a negative output gap,but as the lower inﬂation target is nearer,the output
gap returns back to zero and the nominal interest rate falls to reﬂect the
accomplished disinﬂation.
Figure 6 demonstrates the effect of a permanent negative demand shock,which
can be motivated by changes in the long-run real interest rate,r*,or be viewed as
the limiting case of a very persistent shock with the standard candidates for
motivating it:contractionary ﬁscal policy or decreases in wealth.The ongoing
global ﬁnancial crisis may well be described by such a shock.The immediate
adjustment to the shock follows the discussion above but in the opposite direction,
since a positive demand shock was considered there.As IS shifts to IS’due to the
shock and aggregate demand falls to AD1,we have lower equilibrium inﬂation
which pushes IS further down to IS1 and MR to MR1.In the next time period,ﬁrms
will recognise that inﬂation has decreased and will set their inﬂationary
expectations accordingly,which leads to the downward shift of the AS schedule.
Hence equilibrium inﬂation will continue to fall until the economy reaches the zero
output gap level.This dynamic matches well with the sharp reversal in inﬂation
International Review of Economics Education
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long-term level of inﬂation plus the size of the shock).5 In the subsequent time
period,the shock disappears and the intercept of the AS schedule now becomes
the equilibrium inﬂation level from the previous time period.As the central bank
continues to stabilise against inﬂationary pressure,eventually the AS schedule
returns to the initial position.Since inﬂation returns to the original value,IS and MR
schedules return to their initial positions as well.Impulse responses document the
corresponding evolution of the model’s variables in response to the shock:inﬂation
and the interest rate initially increase and the output gap falls in response to the
stabilising monetary contraction.As the effects of the shock dissipate,the variables
return to their long-term values.
Figure 5 demonstrates the effect of a permanent increase in the nominal interest
rate,a situation that is comparable to a disinﬂationary effort on behalf of the central
bank.Algebraically,this can be illustrated by specifying the shock in terms of the
difference between the target inﬂation rates.In particular,if the central bank
chooses a lower inﬂation target,so that  and sets
we have that the MR schedule now becomes:
The immediate effect of the shock is to generate an upward shift of the MR
schedule and a downward shift of the AD schedule.As equilibrium inﬂation falls,
the AS schedule starts shifting downwards.In the subsequent time period,a
transitory shock would make the AD schedule return back to its initial position;the














t x t t x t t x r x r i γ π π γ π π π γ γ π π γ π π π π + − + + = − − − + − + + =










1 π π <
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The targeting case in the rational-expectations context opens up the possibility for
the discussion of the time inconsistency of optimal policy and optimal central
banker conservatism in the spirit of Rogoff (1985).Figure 8 illustrates the responses
to inﬂation and the output gap to a cost-push shock under both discretion and
commitment;the intuitive difference between the two is particularly clear for low
levels of persistence.Although the policy under commitment generates negative
output gaps in the future,by when the effects of a cost-push shock may have
already dissipated,this lowers inﬂationary expectations and results in lower social
welfare losses in the long run.Since the commitment device that makes it possible
for the central bank to operate over forward-looking expectations may not be
readily available,a lower weight on the output gap volatility term in the social
welfare loss than that of the rest of the society may bring the outcomes closer to
the commitment ideal.
Concluding remarks
Given the popularity of the New Keynesian model among policy-makers and
academics,one should hope that its treatment at all levels of undergraduate
instruction – principles through advanced electives – will become much more
extensive.This paper has provided discussion of some fundamental issues that can
be explored using several versions of the New Keynesian model and illustrated
these issues using an Excel-based workbook.The latter allows us to implement a
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rates in the major industrialised economies that may,in some cases,threaten to
turn to deﬂation.
Rational expectations variants of the New Keynesian model
Modern microfounded macroeconomic models typically treat variables of interest
in short-term models as percentage deviations from their steady state values and,
more importantly,feature rational expectations formed by economic agents.
Woodford (2003) provides an authoritative treatment of such models.6The main
difference with the models described above is the presence of forward-looking
inﬂationary expectations terms and the dynamics being generated by persistent
shocks that follow an autoregressive process of order 1.The set of theoretical issues
that arises in these models is markedly different from the cases covered in the
previous two sections.For instance,Figure 7 illustrates the effect of a 1% cost-push
shock.As before,the Phillips curve shifts upwards;the effect of higher inﬂation
dominates that of the lower output gap,shifting both the IS (due to lower real
interest rate) and MR (due to higher inﬂation) schedules upward.Note,however,
that the inﬂation rate responds by more than the size of the cost-push shock right
away.7This happens because the ﬁrms in the economy anticipate that inﬂation will
persist into the future and immediately set higher prices.
Figure 7:Adverse Supply Shock in the Rational Expectations Instrument Model Figure 8:Adverse Supply Shock in the Rational Expectations Targeting ModelA New Keynesian Workbook 
123
Stiglitz,Joseph E.and Carl E.Walsh (2002).Economics.W.W.Norton,3rd ed.
Svensson,Lars (2002).‘Inﬂation Targeting:Should It Be Modeled as an Instrument Rule or
aTargeting Rule?’European Economic Review, 46,771–780.
Svensson,Lars (2003).‘What Is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment in Monetary
Policy through Targeting Rules’.Journal of Economic Literature,41,426–477.
Taylor,John (1993).‘Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice’.Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy,39,195–214.
Taylor,John B.(2000).‘Teaching Modern Macroeconomics at the Principles Level’.
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings,90(2),90–94.
Taylor,John B.(2007).Principles of Macroeconomics.Houghton Mifflin,5th ed.
Turner,Paul (2006).‘Teaching Undergraduate Macroeconomics with the Taylor-Romer
Model’.International Review of Economics Education,5(1),73–82.
Walsh,Carl E.(2002).‘Teaching Inﬂation Targeting:An Analysis for Intermediate Macro’.
Journal of Economic Education,33(4),333–347.
Woodford,Michael (2003).Interest and Prices:Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy.
Princeton:Princeton University Press.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Carleton College for ﬁnancial assistance,my department
colleagues for helpful comments,and Henry Gross for excellent assistance with the
development of the Excel application.A technical appendix with all derivations and
the companion Excel workbook are available at the author’s website:
http://www.people.carleton.edu/~pkapinos.
Contact details
International Review of Economics Education
122
relatively straightforward graphical apparatus whose difficulty level,at least for the
static and adaptive expectations models,is certainly comparable to the one in the
traditional undergraduate texts.
Notes
1 The version of the IS equation presented in Section 4 can be derived as the Euler
equation for the household's intertemporal utility maximisation problem.The
forward-looking AS relation can be derived as the ﬁrst-order condition with respect
to price for a monopolistically competitive ﬁrm in a staggered pricing setting.The
Taylor rule is imposed by the central bank.
2 For a more detailed treatment of the static model,see Boﬁnger et al.(2006).
3 Another way of seeing why the IS schedule shifts is as follows:Higher inﬂation,ceteris
paribus, lowers the real interest rate,stimulating aggregate demand,which can be
modelled as a rightward IS shift.
4 The temporary deviations can be described as transitory shocks in below.
5 MR’and IS’schedules in the adaptive expectations model show the positions of the
respective relations in response to the shock under the assumption that inﬂation is at
the long-run level.Schedules marked by ‘t’designate the position of the respective
relations at that particular time period.
6 This paper provides only a brief description of issues that arise in the rational-
expectations context.More detailed information is available at the author's website.
7 Graphically,persistence affects the slopes of the schedules as well.Formal derivations
are available in the technical appendix and the companion questionnaire discusses
these effects more extensively.
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